First of all, we summarize the cryptosystem proposed in [2], which was subsequently improved in [3] in order to avoid the cryptanalysis appearing in [4] . The authors proposed a symmetric cryptosystem based on the Pell equation in the finite field , so that the Pell equation can be written as (1) where is a prime number and and are quadratic residues modulo . In the proposed symmetrical cryptosystem, there are two classes of keys: the primary key is a prime number , where is the bitlength of ; the secondary key is a couple of prime numbers, and in the interval . The plaintext corresponding to a block of the original message of bits, , is the integer defined as , where is the decimal expression of the block . The ciphertext, with bitlength , corresponding to is the pair of integers given by (2) The deciphering process to obtain from takes into account the following expressions: obtained from (2) and (1).
I. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS

T HE Brahmagupta-Bhãskara (BB) equation is the quadratic Diophantine equation
where is an integer and is a positive integer such that is irrational. For the particular case , the equation is called the Pell equation.
The goal of this paper is to show that the two cryptosystems proposed by Rama Murthy and Swamy in [2] and [3] are vulnerable to the known-plaintext attack and, hence, they are insecure.
First of all, we summarize the cryptosystem proposed in [2] , which was subsequently improved in [3] in order to avoid the cryptanalysis appearing in [4] . The authors proposed a symmetric cryptosystem based on the Pell equation in the finite field , so that the Pell equation can be written as (1) where is a prime number and and are quadratic residues modulo . In the proposed symmetrical cryptosystem, there are two classes of keys: the primary key is a prime number , where is the bitlength of ; the secondary key is a couple of prime numbers, and in the interval . The plaintext corresponding to a block of the original message of bits, , is the integer defined as , where is the decimal expression of the block . The ciphertext, with bitlength , corresponding to is the pair of integers given by (2) The deciphering process to obtain from takes into account the following expressions:
obtained from (2) and (1).
The authors claim that the security of this cryptosystem is based on the fact that there are infinitely many prime numbers greater than , and the keys are only limited by practical hardware/software considerations. Nevertheless, Youssef presented in [4] a known-plaintext attack to the previous cryptosystem by using a system of four linear equations over . The equations are deduced from the knowledge of two plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts and the four unknowns , and to yield
Once the cryptanalyst has obtained the values , a similar system is solved by using the equations derived from or and a new pair of plaintext-ciphertext:
. Then, new rational values for and are obtained, and from them the value of provides a multiple of the prime .
In order to improve the previous cryptosystem, Rama Murthy and Swamy proposed in [3] a modification in the ciphering process. With the same notations as above, the ciphertext , corresponding to a given plaintext , is computed as follows: (4) 1549-7747/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE With such a modification, the attack proposed by Youssef is not effective as the linear system of equations (3) becomes which cannot be solved in the unknowns , and , when , and are known.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS
Here, we present a cryptanalysis to the cryptosystem introduced in [3] by using a known-plaintext attack. Suppose that four distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs , are known. The cryptanalysis is based on the fact that the system of equations (5) obtained from (1) and (4) admits a unique solution "in " whenever the following inequalities hold:
In fact, as a simple computation shows, we have (6) (7) (8) (9) and (10) and (11), shown at the bottom of the page.
Notice that the running time for solving the system (5) is negligible as explicit formulas are used. Once , and are known, and can be directly obtained as follows:
(12)
As the equations for have not been used in the system (5), they allow one to compute , where is the numerator of the fraction for , and is a multiple of , as follows from the very definition of the BB equation modulo . Furthermore, the bitlength of is less than , as is the sum of three summands each of which being, at most, a product of two factors of bitlength , and other summands of less bitlength, as
Hence, the value of is derived from directly, without using any sophisticated factorization algorithm. Once the value of is known, the values of and are obtained by reducing modulo the rational values for and in (6) and (7). Next, we show how to perform the cryptanalysis either when or vanishes. If , then and are completely determined, namely Hence, it suffices to change one of the two plaintexts and to keep the other.
Moreover, the expressions and cannot vanish simultaneously as (10) (11) the vanishing of both expressions imply , which contradicts the assumption. Consequently, if , then either or and we proceed as in the first case. The cryptanalysis to the original cryptosystem as formulated in [2] is similar to the previous one, by using an analogous system to (5), which provides the following expressions: where III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES A numerical example with artificially small values is presented below.
Suppose that the secret keys are , and let us consider the following plaintext-ciphertext pairs:
Here,
. The values of (6) and (7) are given at the bottom of the page, and the values of (8)- (13) are By using the software package MAPLE over an Intel Pentium D PC, CPU 3.20 GHz, 2.00 GB RAM, under Windows XP (SP 2), the running time to compute these values was 0.062 s.
For a prime number with bitlength , say and using the following four random plaintexts:
the running time to compute the values of , and was 0.065 s.
For a larger prime of 128 bits the running time to break the cryptosystem was 0.078 s. For the secret primary key of 192 bits and secondary keys the running time to break the cryptosystem was 0.094 s. In this case, we obtained .
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 1) As shown above, it usually suffices to consider four distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs to recover the primary and the secondary keys of the both proposed symmetric cryptosystems in a computationally feasible way. 2) Although the values in are assumed to be quadratic residues in [2] and [3] , which is justified by the authors (personal communication) in order to avoid vulnerabilities, this property seems to play no role in the cryptanalysis proposed.
3) The cryptanalysis proposed does not involve general factorization algorithms, but only to compute the greatest common divisor of several pairs of integers and a few factors much smaller than the modulus in these greatest common divisors. As is well known, e.g., see [1, Sec. 2.4] , the can be computed efficiently in polynomial time,
, by using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
